論中國強制要約收購制度之合理性

自上世紀九十年代英國強制要約收購制度被移植至中國後，中國對該制度進行了多次修訂，極大地擴大了要約義務豁免的範圍。修訂後的強制要約收購制度爭議頗多，許多聲音認為該修訂損害了小股東的經濟利益，但實證證據的缺乏導致該爭議至今未得出結論。本文從法經濟學視角對該問題進行實證研究，分析了2011年至2014年所有要約義務豁免案例中目標公司績效，發現修訂後的強制要約收購制度能夠顯著促進目標上市公司績效提升，小股東的經濟利益未受到損害，因而中國對強制要約收購制度的修訂具有合理性。該實證證據也對西方的靜態模式—動態模式理論之爭做出了一定貢獻。

This study uses empirical evidence to give a relatively convincing answer to the heated debate as to whether China’s modified Mandatory Bid Rule(MBR)really undermines minority shareholders’economic interests. After transplanting the MBR from the UK in the early 1990 s, China amended this rule and grants exceptions on the basis of a much broader scope of grounds, and most acquirers who triggered the mandatory bid obligation could obtain the CSRC’s dispensation. While there is a large body of literature discussing whether this modification undermines minority shareholders’economic benefits, however, none of them provides convincing empirical evidence, so the lack of empirical evidence makes either the advocators’or objectors’claims unpersuasive. This article seeks to address the current deficiency in research on empirical evidence. By using quantitative evidence, this study finds that China’s modified MBR can significantly facilitate better performance by listed companies, so minority shareholders’economic benefits were not undermined even though there were no material mandatory offers. This article also uses China’s empirical evidence to contribute to the debate between the static-model theory and dynamic-model theory in the western world.