東日本大震災之危機處理：從防災與災害危機處理體系觀察

Crisis Management in the Great East Japan Earthquake: View of Emergency and Disaster Management System

2011年3月11日下午，日本發生了東日本大地震，不僅引發大規模的海嘯，更造成位於福島縣的兩座核電廠出現了輻射塵外洩等一連串的危機。輿論抨擊菅直人政權的危機處理過程反應太慢，但實際上菅政權在災害發生後便立刻展開危機處理機制的運作並推動相關措施。本文目的係從制度面分析現有資訊，探討日本政府當時如何運用其防災‧災害危機處理體系進行危機處理。本文發現，日本現行的防災‧災害體系在中央與地方政府之間，以及中央政府的指揮系統上欠缺整合，導致日本政府無法因應像此次東日本大地震如此災害範圍廣泛與災情多樣化的災害危機處理

On 11 March 2011, massive Tsunami was triggered by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake in northeast Japan (known as the Great East Japan Earthquake), causing a series of ongoing equipment failures and releases of radioactive materials at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Even though the Prime Minister of Japan, Naoto Kan, set up an emergency headquarter in his office immediately after the earthquake in order to coordinate the governmental mechanisms to execute disaster relief works, the public still criticize that the Prime Minister did not respond to the crisis promptly. This paper aims to analyze the emergency and disaster management system of Japan, and how the Prime Minister Kan administered this system to execute disaster relief works after the earthquake. It is found that the emergency and disaster management system is not well integrated in Japan. Especially the chain of command in the central government and the inconsistency about the central and local government system is obscurity. These made the confusions in the disaster relief works by the Kan Cabinet.