英文摘要 |
More than 30 years after the International Court of Justice rejected Morocco's claim of pre-colonial territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara, a political solution on the status of the Non-Self-Governing Territory has yet to be reached and despite the ongoing UN efforts to negotiate a referendum, the Sahrawis have yet to exercise their right to self-determination. Robert Putnam's model of multi-level games shows us how in conflict resolution, domestic and external factors exert equally salient effects on overall outcomes. Deadlock in the second game may be attributed to first game factors; likewise external pressures also mean that neither side can make real concessions and ultimately that attempts to broker a solution can thus prove unsuccessful. Most literature on the subject focuses on the first and second games, this article goes beyond this, looking to the third game, the wider geopolitical environment for explanation of the longstanding impasse in the negotiation process. Specifically, it attempts to explain how the impact of American, European Union, French and Spanish policy and their strategic interests in the Maghreb could effect developments in the dispute over Western Sahara. |