日本企業融資與治理結構的分析

The analysis of Japanese Enterprise financing and Governance structure

自從1990年代產生泡沫經濟後，最常被提及的一個問題，就是為什麼當時企業明顯過度投資時沒有遭到攔阻？銀行在對企業貸款的風險審查上存在著怎樣的問題？大藏省對金融的監管到底出了什麼問題？近年來日本政府也開始注意到關於公司治理方面的問題，由於日本企業的融資結構不同於其他發達國家企業的融資結構。在日本主要銀行與企業之間的融資關係，就是彼此的相互持股。它也決定了董事會的虛擬性質和銀行在企業經營行為監控上扮演了非常重要的角色。既然日本的公司治理結構存在著問題，但僅是銀行外部監控機制沒有適時發揮功能嗎？還是日本的企業融資結構與治理結構間的關係產生了問題？國家在這當中要扮演的監督角色是否有所失職？本文是希望能從日本企業融資結構的特點切入，去理解企業與銀行二者之間的關係，並試圖去解釋在這二者關係之外的國家角色所造成的影響。在這樣的體制之下，銀行與企業成為生命共同體，作者認為這形成一種爾機制讓日本成為一個幾近於半封閉的市場，內層則是形成由銀行與企業所形成的交叉持股與護送船艦體制，日本在這樣的封閉體系之下，所形成的體系非常嚴密而僵化。作者認為，在面臨全球化與自由化之際，以監督取代行政指導，以司法代替行政，以去管制代替管制都是日本政府可以思考的方向

One of the important issues mentioned in the studies on ''bubble economy'' is how the excess investment occurred in the 1990s. Is there anything wrong with the system of mortgage assessment, or the whole system of financial supervision? These are important topics concerning cooperate governance in Japan. Unlike the development of most advanced countries, cross share-holding between the cooperation and the banking is not unusual in Japan. Due to the feature of crossholding, banking has certain influence on the running of cooperation itself. Can we blame the failure of cooperate governance on the banking, or the dysfunction of state to regulate the cross share-holding? This study tends to analyse the role of the interaction between the banking and the cooperate from the angle of cross share-holding, together with the role of the sate in this system. This study displays that the cross share-holding system binds the banking and the cooperate, which contributes to the inefficiency of cooperate governance and financial supervision. The author proposes a more open-structured interaction to replace the existing cross share-holding system, which may increase the competition of Japanese financial system in era of globalisation.