半總統制的演化：總統化與內閣不穩定

The Evolution of Semi-presidentialism: Presidentialization and Cabinet Instability

現今半總統制國家數目已經正式超越純粹總統制與內閣制，成為當今最多國家採用的政體類型。近來部分研究關注於半總統制國家的演化發展，除探討半總統制國家朝向內閣制傾斜的演化趨勢外，半總統制國家朝向「總統化」（presidentialisation）發展現象也成為學界關心的新研究焦點。本研究嘗試從半總統制國家朝向總統化發展的角度，探討總統化的定義內涵與演化動力、總統化對於政黨體系的影響，特別著重於總統化對於內閣性質以及內閣穩定度（stability of cabinet）的影響。半總統體制下的政黨必須同時面對總統及國會選舉，政黨必須維持總統的高聲望以發揮衣尾效應（coattail effects）來帶動國會的選舉，而獲勝關鍵依據於總統個人聲望與政府行政績效的成功。一方面總統選舉成為政黨存亡關鍵，因此總統保衛戰成為一切政治運作的核心，政黨選舉邏輯成為塑造帝王戰略。另一方面，總統化現象導致內閣成為總統的避雷針（lightning rod）或代罪羔羊（scapegoat），總統往往以改組內閣（reshuffle）或部分調整內閣（cabinet turnover）作為挽救總統民意或保有總統高聲望的政治動作，進而導致內閣的不穩定，且政黨體系朝向兩黨化（bipartisation）將更為強化此種現象。半總統制國家「總統化」最明顯的政治格局展現應該為總統與國會多數相同的一致性政府時期，而過去觀點普遍認為一致性政府的政府穩定性最高，但半總統制「總統化」現象會增加總統介入內閣組成動機，特別是避雷針與代罪羔羊效應將導致總統更動內閣更為頻繁，此一論證與既有觀點有所不同，本文透過衡量內閣穩定度的主要指標，針對法國、臺灣以及俄國三個半總統制國家進行跨國比較。本文發現半總統制「總統化」發展強化了總統主導內閣改組與更替的頻率，但這種因總統化所導致的避雷針效應所產生的內閣變動頻率，主要呈現是更為頻繁地局部內閣變動（cabinet turnover），而非總體的內閣改組（cabinet reshuffle）。

The semi-presidential system has become the most popular regime type in the world, indicated by the number of states that adopted the system having surpassed that of purely presidential system and the parliamentary system since 2000. A number of major studies have recently focused on the evolution of semi-presidentialism; some of the researches have sketched the working mode of parlimentalization of semi-presidential system, and considerable studies have been paying attentions to the development of a semi-presidential system moving towards a presidentialized working mode. This research focuses on the development of presidentialization of politics in the semi-presidential system and explores how the presidentialization has led to an interrelated processes on the existing political party system as well as on the stability of cabinet. The goal of political parties under semi-presidential states is to win the presidential and parliamentary elections, thus the parties have to keep high reputation of each's own presidential candidate in order to generate coat-tail effects on parliamentary elections. The key to win elections depends on the presidential candidate's personal popularity and leadership. Given the presidential election being the most critical to party survival, the electoral strategy of the party has often become a king-making strategy: increasing leadership power and autonomy within the political executive and within political parties as well as increasingly leadership-centered electoral processes. As a result, the king-making process - the symptom of presidentialization - results in the cabinet becoming a 'lightning rod' to the president: a privileged tool of changing members of the cabinet to answer public opinion discontent that leads to declining stability of the cabinet. Some relative studies have shown that the president has used this institutional privilege to reshuffle and replace cabinet in his own best interests and that the bipartisan politics further reinforce this kind of development. The most significant political situation of presidentialization in semipresidentialism is the unified government. Generally believed that the unified government should be the most stable, however on the contrary, the presidentialization of semi-presidentialism enforces presidential power to interfere with cabinet formation, by the effects of 'lightning rod' and 'scapegoat' inducing the president to change the cabinet frequently. This observation is quite different to the existing argument. This article uses some major indicators to measure the cabinet stability and conducts a crossnational comparison via France, Taiwan and Russia. The findings of this article suggest that the presidentialization of semi-presidmetialism does enforce frequent of cabinet changes, but this mainly appears as increased frequency of partial cabinet turnover, not the general cabinet reshuffling.