英文摘要 |
Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the U.S. has modified its formerly passive attitude of non-involvement to an active role of promoting trust and confidence between the PRC and Taiwan. The Clinton administration advised that Taiwan and China should do all they can to build confidence and avoid provocative actions and words. Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth indicated that he would like to see cross-Strait dialogue lead to 'interim agreements, perhaps in combination with specific confidence building measures, on any number of difficult topics,' but that the U.S. 'will avoid interfering as the two sides pursue peaceful resolution of differences' The Bush administration also encourages Taipei and Beijing to begin exploring confidence-building measures that reduce the chance for military miscalculation and accidents, and improve the quality of communications in the event of a crisis. CBMs and an interim agreement in the Taiwan Strait are closely related, and their implementation might have an impact on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. While the U.S. has been rejecting the role of mediator in the Taiwan Strait, the arms sale policy toward Taiwan, the stand on Taiwan's future status, and the relationship with the PRC, etc., will have great implications for Taipei to move toward a CBM mechanism with Beijing. Taipei and Beijing have different expectations for the U.S. role in the Taiwan Strait dispute. Reactions from Taipei and Beijing on U.S.-proposed CBMs and interim agreements might determine the outcome of this peace initiative in the Taiwan Strait. |