我國中央對地方政府績效考核的制度安排與弔詭：以縣市社會福利服務評鑑為例

The Institutional Arrangements and Paradox of Central Government’s Evaluation on Local Governments’ Performance in Taiwan: A Case of Social Welfare Evaluation System

本文採用深度訪談及焦點團體等質性研究方法蒐集資料，系統性的檢視自2001年起中央對地方社會福利績效考核的制度安排與運作上的盲點。具體研究建議如下：第一，民選首長施政不重視社會福利，允宜訴諸輿論公意，並回歸民主政治選舉罷免的相關機制；第二，縣市競爭的代價，可朝「解除管制」的方向，中央適度減少管考範圍與強度；第三，為避免馬太效應，建議中央可研議規劃設置基金，提供財政能力較弱的縣市政府申請計畫型補助，以彌補一般性補助的缺口。

 

The purpose of this study is to systematically explore the institutional arrangements and paradox of the “Social Welfare Policy Planning and Control and Assessment” since 2001. Here are the suggestions from this research: (1) regarding local governors in ignorance of the social welfare, it is necessary to get back to the basics of democratic election mechanism through which people can show their discontent with their votes; (2) concerning the cost of competition, deregulation may be a good idea, which means the central government can appropriately reduce the range and the intensity of the evaluation; (3) in order to avoid the Matthew Effect which could negatively affect the rights and interests of the people, the central government may set up funds for financially disadvantaged local governments to apply as project subsidies, which may well make up for the gaps in general grants. The research results can provide a reference for policy formulation.