英文摘要 |
Past studies of China's interactions with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have been constrained by an unilateral perspective that failed to take into account the related functions of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA), the United Nations Experts Group (UNEG), the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HOCC) and their impact on China. In other words, without such comparison groups, accounts for China's records on regime compliance tend to be limited in scope. By enlarging the scope of study, this article examines the viability of China's strategy and policy towards the missile regimes during 1987-2002 and provides a viable basis for systematic analysis. The principal purposes of this article are to explore China's responses to the norms and regulations stipulated by these missile regimes. This article will analyze and construct first an analytical framework of China's strategy on regime compliance, namely using a three- pillar scheme; second, the institutional arrangements of the missile regimes, including export control, transparency and confidence-building measures; third, the contents and dynamics of the principled noncompliance positions taken by China; fourth, the repeated contradictory records of China's compelling compliance; fifth, China's strategy of managing compliance by examining China's recent announced missile export control regulations and control lists; and finally, this article will summarize the analytical results presented in the discussions. The main conclusion will be discussed and related to the theoretical implications of China's regime compliance strategy. |