美國推動聯合國安理會1441號決議案分析

The U. S. Campaign for U. N. S. C Resolution 1441

二○○三年三月美國對伊拉克發動戰爭，使聯合國安理會於戰前通過之1441號對伊武檢決議隨之失去作用。然美國推動該決議之政策過程，既構成美國對伊政策之不可或缺的一部份，也是探究布希政府外交政策思維的重要課題。本論文之主要目的在於，檢視美國推動此一決議的策略思考、影響因素、決策過程及成效與影響。本文認為，美國之推動1441號決議，是以其先制攻擊為後盾，對伊拉克進行多邊之強制外交政策，俾促進美國之國家利益。布希總統基於對伊進行大規模作戰部署需要較長時間，以及國內民意與國際盟邦均傾向不放棄聯合國路線之考慮下，遂決定推動1441號決議，並藉此推動時程對伊進行壓倒性作戰的準備。惟美國以推動此決議作為對伊動武之依據的企圖心，卻使武檢成效在根本上有其侷限。

The U.S. campaign for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was an integral part of U.S. policy toward Iraq, although the resolution became ineffectual at the outbreak of U.S-Iraq war on 19 March, 2003. This paper examines the causes, processes, and effects of the U.S. policy. Furthermore, it concludes that the U.S. has adopted a policy of multilateral coercion enforced by the threat of pre-emptive strikes, aimed at promoting its national interests through the U.N. mechanism. The Bush administration's decision to campaign for Resolution 1441 was made using the persuasive argument that an effective campaign to oust Saddam Hussein would require at least a two-month buildup and as many as 200,000 troops. The U.S. attempt to use the resolution as the rationale for a possible invasion of Iraq undoubtedly also limited the effect of weapons-inspection.