英文摘要 |
Since sovereignty is a vital national interest, the political negotiations between Mainland china and Taiwan fall within the realm of a zero-sum game. Both sides insist on different interpretations of the issues of both political identity and the future resolution of the cross-strait relationship. Taipei pays close attention to parity and security, while Beijing's focus is on opposing independence and promoting unification. According to these break-even points of evaluation, decision-makers must aggregate many diverse estimates into over-all values. They must decide whether agreement as well as to all the prospects and risks of further bargaining. This paper analyses the power and values of cross-strait negotiation tactics that parties with different power structures employ, as well as the influences and out-comes of the status quo.Despite democratic Progressive Party (DPP) member Chen Shui-bian assuming the presidency - thereby stopping the possibility of a third round of CCP-KMT cooperation for unification, the new government still must deal with china's formula of 'one country, two system' and her 'one China' policy. 'Win-set' divisions among the domestic political parties influences Taiwan's bargaining power and strategy. At the same time, the two sides have developed increasing trade interdependence over the past few years. Relatively speaking, however, Taiwan has become more dependent on the Mainland, Beijing believes that time is on its side, with its adversary in a dependent position. The DPP government must re-estimate the cost of controlling resource use; sustaining commitment depletes political energy and a drawn-out negotiation process will interfere with the government's ability to focus on other important foreign and domestic issues. The government must seek both time and opportunity in managing cross-strait ties. |