從協調－合作到衝突－脆弱：論日本垂直整合政經模式的轉變

The Transformation of Political Economy in Japan: Applying the Vertical-Integrative model

日本從一九九一年泡沫經濟破滅以來，歷經一九九三年自民黨垮台、細川護熙政府的政治革新、橋本龍太郎的金融自由化與一九九七年的金融危機，在這一連串的政治及經濟轉變當中，日本一九五五牛的政經體制是否已經完全改觀了呢？是何種因素造成日本政經體制的轉變？這種轉變對於日本經濟發展又會產生何種影響？本文將以垂直整合的政經模式來解釋日本從一九五五年至一九九○年之間的經濟發展，本文主要的論點認為從一九五五年以來垂直整合模式能夠順利運行主要便是在政府、企業與人民對於經濟成長的高度期望，以及對全能官僚體系能力的高度肯定，一旦經濟開始衰退、官僚與派閥結合捲入金權政治的漩渦中，便會形成政府與企業及派閥與派閥之間期望的落差，進而造成彼此之間意見的分裂與衝突，使得協調－合作模式轉變為衝突－脆弱的運作模式。金融與資本是日本經濟快速成長動力的來源，而金權與派閥又是日本政治運作的主要特性，因此本文將比較日本在一九七○年代與一九九○年代金融政治運作的異同來印證理論的假設。

Since the bubble economy burst in 1991, Japanese political economic institutions have witnessed the collapse of the liberal Democratic Party, Hosokawa's political reformation, the Asian currency crisis, and Hashimoto's financial Big Bang. Have Japanese 1955 political economic institutions really changed? Which factors have helped to bring about this change and will new institutional dynamics influence Japanese economic development? This article applies the vertical-integrative model to explain Japanese economic growth from 1955 to 1990 and its transformation in the 1990s. The verticalintegrative model hypothesizes that high expectations regarding GDP growth and regarding the all-powerful bureaucracy by the government, business, and people are the primary motivations stimulating economic development. I would argue that, in a recession, bureaucrats collaborate with factions within the LDP to form money politics. This will cause institutional conflict and fragmentation. To support these hypotheses, this article will examine Japanese financial politics in the 1970s and 1990s respectively.