中央集権体制への傾倒か：第18回共産党大会後の中国における中央と地方の関係

趨向中央集權？中共十八大後的中央與地方關係（Predisposition to Centralization? Central-Local Relations in China after the 18th National Congress of the CPC）

習近平主政後，中央政令能否獲得地方的貫徹？因為政治利益會影響地方應對中央政策的能力，故本文採用「政治利益」模式，分析中共十八大後的中央與地方關係。本文發現：習近平所面臨的地方勢力高於胡錦濤時期。十八大的政治利益分配，乃中央減少而地方增加。在各省中，上海與天津對中央政策的影響力都屬「強有力影響型」。面對地方勢力的提升，中共中央透過人事調動，以降低地方的影響力。此一現象顯示，中央與地方的權力分配，乃趨向中央集權的權力平衡模式。因此，中央最終雖能實施損及地方利益的政策，但過程中將難免遭遇地方的抗拒。

Although Xi Jinping is the eminent military and political leader in the People's Republic of China, his ability to effectively execute decrees is dependent on the support of local leaders. Because political interests affect the ability of local governments to respond to central policies, a political interest model was employed to analyze the relations between central and local governments after the 18th National Congress of the CPC. The research found that Xi Jinping faces local governments with higher levels of power than those in the Hu Jintao period. The distribution of political interests in the 18th National Congress have reduced centrally and increased locally. Among the various provinces, Shanghai and Tianjin are considered to have 'strong and powerful' influences on central policies. Faced with these heightening local powers, the central government sought to reduce local influence through personnel redeployment. After the first plenary session of the 18th Central Committee, Politburo members who were locally stationed decreased from eleven to six. Two Politburo Standing Committee members, who were local representatives, were promoted to the central office. This trend indicates that the power distribution of central and local governments tend to move toward a power balance model of centralization. Therefore, although the central government can implement policies that are discordant with local interests, it is difficult for the central government to avoid resistance from certain provinces.