英文摘要 |
This paper examines relations between U.S. and the Republic of China (Taiwan or ROC) up to the establishment of the 'Nineteen Point Reform Program' in January 1960. Following its defeat in the Chinese Civil War and retreat to Taiwan Island, the Republic of China maintained an excessively large military. Attempts made to reduce military spending were stifled given the continuing policies of 're-conquering the mainland' and maintaining the living standards of those soldiers who had fled to Taiwan. Despite having provided a huge amount of aid to ROC, U.S. was unable to have the regime reduce military expenditure. However, following the release of the Chiang-Dulles Communiqué in 1958 which publicly announced military action as a secondary means of re-conquering the mainland, pressure from the U.S. to cut military spending grew. These demands resurrected the project of cutting troop numbers and reducing military expenditure which had been planned by Ch'en Ch'eng's cabinet and led to a ceiling being placed on ROC's military budget under the 'Nineteen Point Program'. As a result, the 'China-scale' military organization, which had been established so as to 're-conquer the mainland', was constrained to a 'Taiwan- scale' budget. |