Saying is One Thing; Doing is Another? Analyzing the Chinese Nonprofit Organization Model in Investor Protection through the Taiwanese Experience

心口不一？從臺灣投保中心論中國大陸證券投資者維權組織之立法

證券法反詐欺條款之執法，正如同其他違法行為之執法模式，可分為公權力執法（public enforcement），即由主管機關以行政處罰或是轉介檢察機關訴追的手段予以制裁；或是私人訴訟（privateenforcement），即在造成私權受損之情況下，被害人可提起訴訟請求損害賠償。本文指出依據路徑依循（path dependence）理論，每個國家依照自身的政經情勢演變出「公私」不同混合程度之證券欺詐執法模式，如美國，私人訴訟尤其是集團訴訟十分活躍，甚至與公權力執法彼此扞格衝突；相反地，在中國大陸，證券欺詐主要依賴公權力執法，私人訴訟被政府部門相當地抑制。而臺灣，證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心（投保中心）早已「壟斷」了證券欺詐的私人訴訟市場，而投保中心此一由政府與證券期貨業者共同支持所成立之投資人保護機構，無疑地處於美國與中國大陸兩個極端執法模式的中間地帶。本文認為當美國努力地抑制已然失控之證券欺詐集團訴訟，並嘗試授與政府部門更多執法權力的同時，相反地，在2015年4月，中國大陸證券法草案採取類似臺灣投保中心之模式，即授權經政府許可之投資人保護機構代表受害股東提出「公益訴訟」以請求損害賠償。此舉乍看似乎係給予在公權力控制下的私人證券訴訟更多的空間。惟本文指出囿於中國大陸特殊之政經情勢，中國大陸之證券法草案採取了若干與臺灣投保中心不同的作法，其影響之重要性將使得公權力部門更加主導操縱私人證券欺詐訴訟權利之行使，甚至危及尚在萌芽的證券維權組織之發展。

As securities fraud enforcement can be divided into two major categories: (1) public enforcement conducted by administrative agencies, and (2) private enforcement in the form of litigations initiated by defrauded investors, however, this division cannot be viewed as black and white, but rather always within the areas of gray. For example, Taiwan allows a government-sanctioned nonprofit organization serving as a pro bono law firm to initiate securities class actions on behalf of aggrieved shareholders (the Taiwanese NPO model). By virtue of this NPO model, the government not only fills the gap of inactive private securities enforcement, but also retains substantial control over mass tort disputes. Perhaps due to its hybridity that encourages shareholder actions against securities fraud without risking China into a litigious society as the United States do, in April 2015, China’s National People Congress drafted the amendment to China’s Securities Law by reference to the Taiwanese NPO model (the Chinese NPO model), in which China promises to grant the civil society more enforcement power to protect shareholder interests. As a result, this Article examines whether the 2015 draft amendment could lead China into a hybrid securities enforcement mechanism as its stated purpose. However, by virtue of analyzing relevant provisions of the Chinese NPO model, this Article illustrates that the convergence of NPO models between Taiwan and China may not happen due to path-dependent factors, including political, economic, and cultural circumstance, specific to the Chinese NPO ecology. More importantly, the Chinese NPO model may also reveal China’s intention to use this NPO model as an excuse to eliminate the early emergence of the grassroots NPO’s participation in investor protection, and a guise to grant the government more control over private securities enforcement.