最高法院關於性強制罪違反意願要素的解釋趨向

The Supreme Court’s Interpretation Tendency Towards the Element of “Against the Victim’s Will” of Sexual Offenses

現行的性強制罪（強制性交罪與強制猥褻罪）自1999年修法後迄今施行了近廿年，實務上已經累積了相當數量的判決。最高法院在97年度第5次刑庭決議中，強調違反意願要素在解釋上不受例示概念拘束，並以「意思自由受到妨害」作為違反意願要素的詮釋。但由於「意思自由受到妨害」的語意涵蓋範圍極廣且內涵不明確，不但引發了不同解讀的新爭議（低度強制手段說vs.強制性質不必要說），也和該院在適用刑法第228條時所採取的穩定立場相衝突。

The existing legislation of sexual offenses (rape and sexual assault) has been implemented for nearly 20 years since its amendment in 1999. In its 2008 5th criminal divisions conference, the Supreme Court pointed out the element of “against the victim’s will” should be interpreted as “infringe the victim’s freedom of thought” and will not be bound by the example regulation. However, the ambiguity of “infringe the victim’s freedom of thought” not only causes disputes in its interpretation (low level of compulsion v.whether the compulsion element is unnecessary), but leads to a conflict with the Supreme Court’s stable position on the Article 228 of the Criminal Code. Judging from the Supreme Court’s application of the “against the victim’s will”, there may be two stable interpretations: (1) the victim is less than seven years old (the 2010 7th criminal divisions conference of the Supreme Court), and (2) the sexual behavior is completed by taking advantage of the victim’s religious belief. It remains to be seen whether “taking advantage of the victim’s helpless situation” can become the third one.