地方問責與核能安全治理：以新北市核能安全監督委員會為例   全文下載

Accountability at Local Level and Nuclear Governance: The Case of Nuclear Safety Monitoring Council in New Taipei City

自日本福島核能災變以來，臺灣核能安全體系受到國人的矚目，地方政府也開始重視核能安全問題，尤以擁有三座核電廠的新北市政府最為積極；然而在臺灣的核能安全治理體系中，地方政府長期缺乏參與和監督的機會。為了能有效參與核能安全防災與體系，新北市政府自2013 年決定成立新北市核能安全監督委員會，作為核能安全的審議機關，此亦為臺灣第一個由地方政府成立的核能安全治理架構。
本研究以內容分析與深度訪談的方式，嘗試以「問責性」的三項指標（透明度、正當性審議與禁制力）評估新北市核能安全監督委員會對台灣電力公司與原子能委員會所發揮的問責能力。本研究發現：新北市核能安全監督委員會在初期面臨了法源依據與互信不足的問題，但透過結合民間的創意與動能，在三項問責性指標中都能學習進化、深化議題討論，並發揮行政權限槓桿，逐步取得議題的主導權，最終變相取得核能設施的地方同意權與監督權。由此案例觀之，未來地方層級的問責在臺灣核能安全治理體系中，將可望扮演更關鍵的角色。但儘管如此，核能安全監督委員會侷限於政治菁英為主的運作型態，對於強化風險討論與社區防災韌性仍有不足，未來若欲持續豐富核能安全的內涵，將一般公民以論述者與觀察者的身分引導入核能安全監督委員會治理架構中，應該是一個可行的方向。

Since the Fukushima accident in 2011, Taiwan’s nuclear safety system has been paid great amounts of attention. The local government of the New Taipei City, in which three nuclear plants and possible future interim nuclear waste repository sites are located, has particularly showed its interests in monitoring those facilities. However, in Taiwan’s nuclear governance system, local government has long been deprived from the rights of participation and monitoring. In order to effectively be a part of the governance, the New Taipei City, for the first time in the history of Taiwan’s local governance, has established its own monitoring council to review safety issues of those facilities.
This article, by adopting content analysis and in-depth interviews, aims to examine the effectiveness of this council from the perspective of “accountability” on Tai-Power. With the parameters of “transparency,” “justification through deliberation,” and “capacity to sanction,” this paper concludes that: Although this council encountered legal constraints in the beginning phase, through collaborating with anti-nuclear civil organizations, the local government eventually integrated the creativity and momentum from the civil sector. In three parameters of accountability, the council managed to evolve through learning, to deepen discussion, and to exercise its administrative leverage. By grabbing predominant position in the agenda setting process, the New Taipei Government gained substantial power to veto and monitor local facilities in the end. This case shows that the local governments may be expected to play more important roles in Taiwan’s nuclear safety governance in the future. Having said so, the council in average is still in shortage of participation by a wider array of citizens, and its elites-based practices has also posed certain restraints on its capacity of better monitoring. In order to enrich the contents of nuclear safety, introducing more participation of citizens as observers or initiators may be one of the most feasible ways in the future.