An Overlooked Case for Judicial Review: Striking a Dynamic Balance between Constitutionalism and Democracy

一個遺落的論理：司法審查維持憲政主義與民主政治的動態平衡

司法違憲審查是一種突兀的制度嗎？論者對於憲政民主體制中司法違憲審查制度的正當性，所持見解常存有歧異。許多支持或反對論者以民主政治或民主理論為論證基礎，另外一些支持或反對論者則以憲政主義或憲政理論為論證基礎。本文首先以全球三大趨勢──憲政主義、民主政治、司法違憲審查制度──為背景，點出問題意識：司法違憲審查制度在憲政民主體制的角色為何？其次，從詳細的文獻分析凸顯現存文獻對上述重要問題的探究有所不足：即欠缺從憲政民主體制的結構與功能面向來探究司法違憲審查制度的重要角色。接著，為填補此一不足，本文採取結構與功能研究途徑，在結構層次上論證當代憲政民主乃是含蓋憲政主義與民主政治的結構體系；在功能分析上，分別從必要性、可行性、適當性等三個基礎，來詳細論證：司法違憲審查制度的重要角色在於維持憲政主義與民主政治的動態平衡。依此論證，司法違憲審查可視為是當代憲政民主體制中，用以維持憲政主義與民主政治動態平衡的必要、可行且適當的制度。

Is judicial review a deus ex machina institution? Commentators disagree on the legitimacy of judicial review in a constitutional democracy. Many scholars who argue for (or against) judicial review have based their claims on democracy or democratic theory, while other scholars have founded their positive (or negative) arguments on constitutionalism or constitutional theory. Taking three current trends of worldwide development--the global spread of democratization, the global adoption of constitutionalism, and the global proliferation of judicial review- as background, this paper firstly poses a key question that what is the role of judicial review within a constitutional democracy amid these three rising global trends? Second, based on a general assessment of the literature, this article demonstrates that most scholars neglect the role of judicial review may play in a modern constitutional democracy from the perspectives of structural and functional analysis. And thus extant literature has a gap. Third, in order to fill this gap, this article, relying on a structural and functional approach, embarks on justifying the role of judicial review in striking a dynamic balance between constitutionalism and democracy. At structural level, it tries to illuminate the constitutional democracy as a structural framework consisting of two main systems-constitutionalism and democracy. Functionally analyzing, the justification will be made on the bases of three major pillars: necessity, feasibility, and suitability. Accordingly, judicial review might be plausibly regarded as a necessary, feasible, and suitable institution for maintaining a proper balance between constitutionalism and democracy in modern democracies.