多層次競爭：「天津濱海新區」的發展與挑戰

Multi-Level Competition: The Development and Challenge of 'Tianjin Binhai New Area'

2005年10月中國將「加快濱海新區發展」寫進「十一五」規劃建議中，天津濱海新區正式納入中國國家整體發展戰略，再一次被定位為帶動「環渤海經濟圈經濟」發展的「引擎」。歸納2005年底至今的改革實驗區，以及諸多中央政策利基，主要是讓天津濱海新區可在多項管理體制上，直接報准國務院後「先試先行」，包括金融、土地與行政等三方面管理體制。就此看來，天津市與濱海新區的發展，似乎擺脫之前的沈潛命運，進入加速發展階段。然而，論地理位置、人文環境與行政層級，天津並不亞於上海，但天津新區發展遠遠落後於浦東新區。因此，本文試圖透過各種關於中國經濟運作與區域發展中的地方政府角色與競爭觀點，說明天津濱海新區的發展機會與困境。本文認為，天津濱海新區的成立、沉寂和蓬勃發展，與中國經濟體制改革模式息息相關。中國經濟體制改革模式在宏觀層次上，運用全球化機制，採取「內外聯結」邏輯，在微觀層次上，中央為最終仲裁者，開放各大大小小「區域／行政區競爭」；然而，區域間失序的競爭將是此種區域創新機制的危機所在。本文以天津濱海新區為例，說明中國區域競爭不僅出現在同級政府間，也出現在不同級別的政府間，形成多層次的競爭關係。此種「多層次競爭」的唯一解套機會是中央政府的強勢介入。

To accelerate the development of Binhai New Area' was written into the '1 lth Five-Year Plan' which officially brougth the Tianjin Binhai New Area (TBNA) into the PRC's overall national developmental strategy in October 2005. The TBNA was once again positioned to be the 'leading force' for the development of 'Bohai Economic Rim', which accompanied a number of preferential policies. Having summarized the reform experimental zone since the end of 2005, various central policies have deregulated management systems of TBNA, implementing 'early and pilot measures' on financial, land and administrative systems. It seems that the development of TBNA had gotten rid of apst depressed situation and come to an accelerating developmental phase. In terms of geographical location, human environment and administration level, Tianjin is no less than Shanghai. Nevertheless, TBAN is far less developed than the Pudong New Area. Consequently, this article explores the opportunities and dilemmas that TBNA is facing by adopting the political logic of Chinese regional development.This article argues that TBNA’s establishment, stillness and prosperity are closely related to the model of Chinese economic reforms. At macro level,the reformed model makes use of globalization mechanism and adopts the logic of “inward and outward linkage”. At micro level, the power lies with the central government to open various regional/administrative districts game competition. However, the disordered inter-regional competitions will be the crisis of the aforesaid regional innovation mechanism. Using the TBNA as a case study, this paper uses the example of Chinese regional competitions in that they exist not only between same-level governments, but also between different levels of governments. The solution for this multi-level competition relies on the central government’s strong intervention, which also illustrates that the present Chinese economic reform is adhered to the logic of the partystate system.