犯罪行為人的罪責——心理的事實還是規範的歸責？

The Offender’s Guilt: Psychological Fact or Normative Ascription of Blame?

對於一些刑法學者而言，行為人的「罪責」或可非難性是一種與行為人有關的心理事實。其他人則是認為行為人的「罪責」是將非難予以規範性歸責的結果。這些觀點中哪一個更可取的提問，不僅僅提出了一個理論性的問題。此問題之答案對於刑法中的罪責原則之涵蓋範圍也是具有決定性的。本文將藉由兩個例子來說明此點。
第一個例子是關於因為有意識地自醉而在自我招致無責任能力狀態下行為之行為人的刑事責任。相較於臺灣刑法（第十九條第三項），德國刑法對於以可非難之方式招致自己欠缺責任能力之行為人，並不排除於有關無責任能力行為人的規定適用範圍之外（德國刑法典第二十條）。反對臺灣法中此等規定，捍衛德國法立場的學者主張，對於有過咎地招致自己無責任能力的行為人排除掉無責任能力之抗辯，違反了行為人被禁止之行為必須與其有過咎之心理狀態同時存在之原則（同時存在原則）。因此，他們得出結論認為，臺灣法採取的解決方案違反了罪責原則。本文認為，此種批評忽略了刑法罪責基本的規範性質。刑法罪責作為一種規範性的概念，是可以歸屬至時間上發生在刑法禁止行為實行之前的行為。
第二個例子是關於罪責原則是否係以「或有或無」之方式運作，或者某一特定刑法規定可否以或多或少之程度符合罪責原則的問題。有人認為，將罪責原則以二值來處理的學界通說是基於對罪責／可非難性的本體論理解（罪責作為心理事實）。立基於對罪責規範性的理解上（罪責作為非難的歸責），進一步的區分則變得可能。因此，罪責原則確切而言被解釋為一種原則（在法理論的意義上）而不是一種規則。這兩種解釋都有各自的優點和缺點。對於這些解釋加以考量，我們在罪責原則適用的核心領域應將其解釋為規則，在其適用的邊陲領域則應解釋為原則。

For some criminal law scholars, an offender’s “guilt” or blamewor-thiness is a psychological fact about the offender. Others take his “guilt” to be the result of a normative ascription of blame. The question which of these perspectives is preferable does not merely raise a theo-retical problem. The answer is decisive for the reach of the criminal law’s culpability principle. This paper illustrates this point with two ex-amples. The first example concerns the criminal liability of an offender who has acted in a state of self-induced incapacity arising from volun-tary intoxication. In contrast to Taiwanese criminal law (see section 19(3) of the Criminal Code of Taiwan), German criminal law does not exclude offenders who have in a blameworthy manner brought about their own lack of capacity from the application of the provision concern-ing offenders lacking criminal capacity (section 20 of the German Crim-inal Code). Against provisions such as the one found in Taiwanese law, scholars who defend the German position argue that to exclude an of-fender who culpably brought about his own lack of capacity from an incapacity-based defence is to violate the principle that an offender’s prohibited conduct must coincide with his culpable state of mind (the correspondence principle). They therefore conclude that the solution preferred by Taiwanese law violates the culpability principle. This paper argues that this critique misses the essentially normative character of criminal guilt. As a normative notion, criminal guilt can attach to behav-iour that in temporal terms is performed before the criminally prohibited conduct is carried out. The second example concerns the question whether the culpability principle functions in an “all or nothing” way or whether a particular criminal provision can comply with the culpability principle to a greater or lesser degree. It is argued that the prevailing notion in the literature that treats the culpability principle as binary is based on an ontological understanding of guilt/blameworthiness (guilt as a psychological fact). On the basis of a normative conception of culpability (guilt as the at-tribution of blame), further differentiations become possible. The culpa-bility principle is, then, indeed interpreted as a principle (in the legal-theoretical sense) rather than as a rule. Both interpretations have their own advantages and drawbacks. A consideration of these should lead us to interpret the culpability principle in its core area of application as a rule, and in its penumbral area of application as a principle.