財政移轉支付與地方財政努力 — 一階段隨機邊界分析法之應用

An Application of the One-Stage Stochastic Frontier Analysis to the Analysis of Fiscal Transfers and Fiscal Efforts

本研究之理論模型推論非條件式移轉會抑制地方財政努力，條件式移轉則取決於兩個作用相反的效果。利用一階段隨機邊界分析法，本研究估算我國23 個地方政府自2001年至2010 年度的潛在自有財源，並檢驗財政移轉對地方財政努力的影響。實證結果發現各地方政府的財政努力程度存在顯著的差異；無論是條件式移轉收入或非條件式移轉收入都會降低地方財政努力水準；每人支出水準較高之轄區，地方財政努力水準愈高；可支配所得水準較高之轄區，地方財政努力水準愈低；地方財政努力水準在縣 (市) 首長選舉年度有偏低的現象；考慮時間趨勢，樣本期間內整體地方政府的財政努力水準有提昇的趨勢。

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the potential own-source revenues of each local government and to identify the impacts of two different kinds of transfers—conditional and unconditional—on local fiscal efforts. We develop a theoretical model to predict that unconditional transfers reduce local fiscal efforts; meanwhile, the impacts of conditional transfers on fiscal efforts are decided by two opposite effects, and, therefore, are ambiguous. Using the panel dataset of Taiwanese 23 local governments for the period 2001-2010, we found that there exist significant differences of fiscal efforts in collecting own-source revenues of local governments. The results show that both conditional and unconditional transfers restrain fiscal efforts. Fiscal efforts are positively correlated to per capita expenditure, and negatively correlated to disposable income. Meanwhile, fiscal efforts are lower in local governor election years. Considering the time trend, the overall fiscal efforts show an upward trend during the sample periods.