An Analysis of Institutional Choices in Regulating Internet Spam

規範網路垃圾郵件之機構選擇分析

網際網路提供快速資訊流通及跨國界的管道，如此的管道對於資訊之傳播宛如一刀兩面，利弊兼具。自動發出的商務電子郵件，通稱「垃圾郵件」，係指未經電子郵件用戶之許可，透過所取得的電子郵件名冊，以寄送商業行銷資訊為目的，廣泛、大量的寄出電子垃圾郵件。垃圾郵件之傳播係利用網際網路的特性，以達到快速及有效率的行銷方式，但是垃圾郵件同時也造成相當的負面外部成本，更甚者，垃圾郵件亦造成全球性的網際網路隱私權以及線上安全的衝擊。
因此本文採用法律與經濟分析的方法，以釐清特定適當的機構選擇，以達到發揮垃圾郵件的效益以及降低其所帶來的外部成本。本文同時比較現今美國、歐盟以及日本關於垃圾郵件的規範，藉由比較法之研究與分析，提出國際立法合作以規範垃圾郵件的架構。

The Internet has created a channel that allows for the rapid dissemination of information without regard to geographical boundaries. Unsolicited commercial e-mail (“UCE”), or “spam” as it is commonly known, is generated from enormous lists of e-mail addresses for the purpose of sending commercial information without seeking the e-mail account holder’s permission. Spam capitalizes on the unique nature of the Internet to engage in direct marketing in the fastest and most efficient way currently possible. Nevertheless, UCEs come with significant negative external costs. Furthermore, spam raises global legal issues in the areas of cyberspace privacy and security.
This article approaches this topic by employing a law and economics analysis to identify appropriate institutional choices necessary for the regulation of UCEs. By comparing the legal frameworks of the United States, the European Union and Japan, this article evaluates the effectiveness of different legal approaches and proposes an international legal framework for cooperation in regulating UCEs.