從永久屋興建與居民居住狀況探討災後永久屋政策執行之課題─以高雄市六龜區新發里新開部落為例

Issues of Enforcing Post-Disaster Permanent Housing Policy from the Housing Development and Residents' Living Patterns Point of View - A Case Study of XinKai Tribe, Liouguei District, Kaohsiung City

2009年8月莫拉克風災災後住宅重建執行之永久屋重建，迥異於過去台灣災後住宅重建之執行模式；為了解本次災後永久屋政策在執行過程、以及不同類型之永久屋建成後，居民入住的生活型態與影響因素，本研究以高雄市六龜區新發里新開部落為實證地點，配合永久屋興建時程，分別從永久屋基地選址、興建、居民入住後之生活型態與影響因素等面向，綜合探討永久屋政策在執行方向與過程之議題。
歸納研究的結果發現 (1)以中央主導地方配合之永久屋政策執行，導致地方政府於永久屋興建過程中態度被動與不作為，嚴重延宕在地永久屋之興建時程，降低在地永久屋安置居民之實質功能。(2)異地永久屋(A)基地選址欠缺考量提供居民生計供給之背景環境。(B)政府與NGO協助居民生計配套措施失敗，導致異地永久屋形成“生活與生計分離”之環境特性，使移居者生根不易。(3)特定區劃定與使用的鬆綁，導致原鄉仍可使用的房舍與耕地，吸引移居永久屋居民返鄉生活，前述狀況造成永久屋無法達到真正遷移災區居民，對災害高潛勢地區土地降限使用之功能。

After Typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan on August, 2009, an unique housing recovery process, permanent housing, was enforced by building permanent houses after this disaster. To further understanding the issues of permanent housing policy enforcement, the living status and problems faced by the residents after they moved into the housing environment, and the influence factors from different types of permanent housing developments, this study has investigated the processes based on the development timeline from selecting building sites, construction progresses, to the living patterns of victims from Xinfa Li, Liouguei District, Kaohsiung City after they resided in the permanent houses. This study has summarized and concluded with following findings: (1) the permanent housing policy is leading by Central government and cooperating by local authorities, which makes the local government becoming passive and slothful in participating the policy enforcement and resulted in delays of house building progress and attenuate the designed efficacy of relocation; (2) the permanent housing site distant from original community has following problems: (A) the process of site selection without considering the provision of residents livelihood support capability; (B) the failures of measures proposed by government and NGOs resulting in the separating environments of ""livelihood"" and ""living"", discouraging the wills of relocating victims to stay at the permanent housing site; (3) the ambiguous regulations of ""special district"" and loosing controls of land-uses becoming the attractiveness and incentives for relocated victims to go back to live and farm at their original community, that ultimately resulting in the failure of permanent housing policys relocating function and the initial design to reduce the utilization strength of high risk hazard areas.