招牌理論與受任人忠實義務──從美國證券商義務理論實務發展論臺灣證券商監理法制之強化

Shingle Theory and Fiduciary Duty: Strengthening the Broker-Dealer Regulation in Taiwan from the Perspectives of the Theoretical and Practical Development of the U.S. Counterpart

證券商為資本市場投資人與市場之媒介， 且常扮演造市者之角色，如何在容許證券商為自己利益而經營的同時，兼顧證券商的義務與責任以及投資大眾權利的維護，向來為世界各國證券交易法制的困難課題。本文從美國證券商義務與責任法制的發展出發，討論美國證券商與投資大眾間的法律關係，以及不同種類證券商之義務與責任，並對照臺灣證券商監理法制與投資人保護之現況，冀以供臺灣未來相關法制強化之參考。

The brokers and dealers are intermediaries of the securities investors and the capital markets and often play the role of market makers. How to permit the brokers and dealers to run business for their own interests and at the same time to require them to further the interests of investing public in light of their duties and liabilities is the difficult task of securities regulation around the globe. This Article started from the duties and liabilities of brokers and dealers in the United States to discuss the legal relationship between the brokers and dealers and the investing public and the duties and liabilities of different kinds so attached. The current status quo of the brokers-dealers and the protection of investing public was compared and reviewed in order to be utilized for the reference for the future reform of securities regulation in Taiwan.