再論國家元首之權威在Schmitt理論中之意義：與〈人格權威與政治秩序的形成〉一文商榷

On Schmitt’s Conception of the Authority of the Head of State: A Different View from Chung’s Essay “The Personal Authority and the Formation of Political Order”

從鍾芳樺教授〈人格權威與政治秩序的形成〉一文出發，本文試圖重新梳理Schmitt如何透過「權威」和「權力」在制度上的區分，來解釋國家元首的憲政地位與角色。Schmitt從Constant的「中立權力」概念來說明議會君主制中君主作為國家元首的功能，以及19世紀德意志立憲君主制對於實權君主的主張。進一步，經由將Constant的理論轉嫁到威瑪共和帝國總統，以證成總統的權威地位以及憲法守護者的角色。最終則要說明，儘管總統具有非常權限，Schmitt仍認為在常態下總統是僅具有權威的國家元首，而非具有主動權力的政治領導者。

In this essay I examine the role and function of Hobbes’s account of the laws of nature in his political theory by reconsidering the basis of his concept of political obligation. This essay takes issue with common readings of Hobbes which either considers Hobbesian laws of nature is nothing but counsels from reason(which provides no obligations) or mere hypothetical imperatives(which at best justify prudential obligations). To argue against the common readings, this essay argues that Hobbesian laws of nature is essential to understanding Hobbes’s concept of political obligation because they provide some kind of natural duty by which an effective “reasonable consent” can be defined. In addition, to argue against the view of de facto theory, I argue that both “Consent” and “Safety” are the necessary conditions of Hobbesian conception of political obligation.