英文摘要 |
The essay suggests that even after we, as a society of individuals, successfully justify our ethical right to deprive an offender’s life, a complete account of the death penalty nevertheless entails a further justification that the state’s authority is entitled to exercise such right. Based on a revised account of political authority originally defended by Joseph Raz, I argue that modern individuals shall find themselves unable to acknowledge the political authority of the death penalty. The concept of political authority implies what I call “the dissent test”, which states that a political authority continues to be justified, if and only if, whenever the subjects dissent from its directives, they shall find sufficient reasons to acknowledge the authority. I further argue that modern individuals demand a significant and unusual degree of autonomy in the spheres related to their self-preservation. Hence it follows that whenever we disagree with the court’s decision of a death sentence, we find little reason to suppress our autonomy and therefore are unable to acknowledge our obligation to obey. The political authority of the death penalty fails the “dissent test” and thus cannot be justified. |