薪酬委員會與董監薪酬敏感性之關聯──家族企業的影響

The Relationship between Compensation Committee and Pay-Performance Sensitivity: The Effect of Family Control

為提升公司管理階層薪酬與經營績效的連結，我國自 2011 年開始強制要求上市櫃公司需設置薪酬委員會。然至 2017 年以前，上市櫃公司中，仍存在未設置獨立董事或獨立董事人數不足的問題。同時家族企業董監事的功能性角色，受到獨立性較低的影響，使董監事治理職能效果有所限制，設置薪酬委員會能否發揮其效益值得探討。本研究以董監事薪酬之敏感性為主，分析設置薪酬委員會的效果，並進一步檢測家族企業對此關聯性的影響。研究期間涵蓋 2005 年至 2017 年，經由實證發現設置薪酬委員會可以提升董監事薪酬與績效的連結，但樣本屬於家族企業時，則會減低薪酬委員會的設置效果。

To strengthen the relationship between management compensation and firm performance, listed companies are required to establish compensation committee since 2011. However, due to absence or insufficient independent directors for listed companies before 2017, whether compensation committee is able to meet that goal deserves further investigation, especially for family firms characterized by lack-of-independence board. Therefore, this study explores the establishment of compensation committee on the relationship between compensation committee and pay-performance sensitivity, and further examines the moderating effects of family control. Using samples from 2005 to 2017, the empirical results indicate that the establishment of compensation committees can improve the association between relative performance and director incentive compensation. However, the presence of family control reduces the pay-performance sensitivity, indicating the establishment of the compensation committee is less effective in family firms.