政治哲學的哲學與道德局限－－評桑德爾「正義」

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy-A Critique of Michael Sandel's Book on 'Justice'

在其暢銷著作《正義》中，美國哲學家桑德爾（M. Sandel）針對康德和羅爾斯（J. Rawls）提出的個人自由選擇與評估其選擇的道德價值的正當理由，批判性地探討「自由主義」的道德極限。對自由主義者而言，決定的內容沒有道德相關性；只要按照法律規定，人們有自由選擇想要生活的價值觀。只有個人選擇特定人生的動機的（普遍）證成可以主張道德相關的地位。然而，很可疑的一點是，桑德爾認為，這種形式的方式必須透過「我們分享的共同生活的品質和性質」來完成。道德承諾與我們喜愛和追求的美好生活密不可分，而這又取決於建立一個有助於它的社會。因此，道德哲學必須根植於政治哲學，因為此哲學分支正是探討個人和社會的關係－如他在其早期著作寫到：「家庭、部落、階級、民族或人民」的社會世界。這是因為個人是生活在社群裡「有阻礙的自我」（encumbered self）－是「更廣泛的對象」（wider subject）。因此，特定社群共享的價值觀合理地限制個人選擇（自由）的範圍。桑德爾認為他能針對這種限制提出哲學反思。我認為，桑德爾的哲學構思模糊且矛盾重重。再者，桑德爾所提出的公正社會的規範，需要透過個人從全球（普遍）角度更嚴格的評估，進而透過康德式的基於互相尊重的個人關懷來定義個人自由，而非透過基於固有權威的公共規範。以社群為基礎的規範是衍生的；定義政治正義的是道德，但反之則不然。

In his best-selling book on justice the US philosopher M. Sandel discusses the limits of a liberal ethical approach a la Kant and Rawls which is centered on both the individual freedom to choose and the formal procedures that facilitate fair and just conditions for enabling such free choices for everyone. Amongst liberals the contents of the choices are morally indifferent; people are free to choose values and life-styles which are in accordance with existing laws and the freedom of others. Only the (universal) justification of one's motives for a particular life choice could claim to have a morally relevant status. Such a formal approach, so Sandel skeptically, must be complemented by considerations regarding 'the quality and character of the common life we share'. Moral commitment is inseparably connected to the 'good life' we fancy and pursue, which in turn depends on the establishment of a society that is conducive to it. Moral philosophy, therefore, must be rooted in political philosophy because it is this branch of philosophy which is 'ex professione' concerned with the just integration of the individuals into the social world in which they live-which is, as Sandel wrote previously, the social world of the 'family or tribe or class or nation or people'. It is so because the individual is an 'encumbered self' living within communities-it is a 'wider subject'. The values shared by a given community, therefore, justifiably narrow the scope of choices (i.e. freedoms) of the individual. It is here that Sandel thinks he can give a 'philosophical' account of such limits. But he does not succeed in this task because the philosophical concept he applies is both blurred and partly contradictory. In addition, the norms of a just society as propagated by M. Sandel need to be more open for critical assessment by individuals from a global (universal) perspective. Individual freedom cannot be defined by communal norms based on inherent authoritative virtues, but by individual considerations that are based on mutual respect. Community-based norms are derivative; it is ethics that defines political justice, not vice versa.