論獨立機關的獨立性與其立法監督

The Independence of an Independent Agency and Its Legislative Supervision

「獨立機關」在法制化之後，實務上仍迭生爭議。為此，本文擬釐清獨 立機關「獨立性」之所在，進而分析在權力分立的架構之下，獨立機關的最 適治理模式。本文認為：獨立機關的獨立性，與其說表現在其「專業性」之 上，或要求其「獨立於政治之外」，不如說是呈現在其與最高行政首長之間 的距離感。在這個基礎之上，獨立機關分別具有「功能獨立」、「外部獨立」 及「個案獨立」的特徵；至於獨立機關具有何等程度的「組織獨立」、「內 部獨立」或「通案獨立」特徵，則繫於立法政策的判斷。換言之，獨立機關 運作是否良好，關鍵在於立法監督的成效。 對於獨立機關的立法監督，主要表現於組織面及程序面。以臺灣為例， 目前在組織面上，對於三個相當中央二級獨立機關，雖然都設有關於成員積 極資格、任期交錯、黨派比例的規定，但各自也都存在著若干規範不足，或 制度設計未能充分體現「獨立性」意義的問題；同時，有關同意權行使的相 關程序規定亦有所欠缺。另外，在程序面部分，必須考量獨立機關與一般行 政機關問責基礎的不同，並據此思考獨立機關在決策前，是否負有與其他機 關會商、甚至先由行政院核定的法制；乃至於為強化問責、強制獨立機關揭 露決策因素等，也是未來立法監督上可考慮的設計。

Controversies are aroused constantly over the operation of independent agencies, even after the legislation of Basic Code Governing Central Administrative Agencies Organizations and Organizational Act of the Executive Yuan. This essay is going to clarify the essence of ''independnce'' of an independent agency, and further analyze its optimal modes of governance, where legislative supervision plays an important role. I argue that the indendence of an independent agency lies better in the distance created from the highest executive chief officer, rather than its expertise or independence from politics. On this basis, an independent agency is characterized by its ''functional indendence,'' ''outer indendence,'' and ''adjudicational indendence.'' Relatively, the degrees of an independent agency's ''organizational independence,'' ''inner independence,'' and ''general policy-making independence'' are hinged on legislative discretion. Independent agencies with respective missions may have different combinations of independence-related factors in their institutional designs. There are two main categories of legislative supervisions, organizational and procedural, over independent agencies. Most legislations of independent agencies focus on the organizational aspects. They share similar institutional designs and legitimate issues as well. Taking the practices of Taiwanese independent agencies as examples, although the organizational acts of Central Election Commission, Fair Trade Commission, and National Communications Commission all establish rules regarding commissioners' positive qualifications, staggered terms, and bipartisan requirements, they do not bring the spirit of independence into the application of above terms. Besides, appointment and confirmation procedural rules of above commissioners are far from complete. On the other hand, Judicial Interpretation No. 613 drew our attention to the importance of procedural aspects of legislative supervision. It has been hard to expect an independent agency not to do any general case level policy making. I argue that, asking independent agencies to negotiate with relevant administrative agencies before decision-making, or even leaving certain final policy making power to Executive Yuan, and setting compulsory interfering factors disclosure rules by legislation would be a worth considering institutional design in future legislations.