委內瑞拉糧食生產體系與短缺之研究（2001~2014）：過程與機制

Venezuela's Food Production System and Shortage: Process and Mechanism (2001-2014)

本文目的在探究委內瑞拉查維茲總統執政期間，以國家力量打造的國 有糧食生產體系與相關制度，為何以及如何導致委內瑞拉走向更仰賴糧食 進口，並於國際石油價格崩跌之後陷入嚴重的物資「短缺」。 本文從制度論出發，制度互補作為分析架構，並結合國家角色與國家 結盟進行分析，目的在探究2001～2013年間查維茲總統在「糧食主權」和 「二十一世紀社會主義國家轉型」政策框架下啟動的一系列糧食與農業政 策，包括：土地改革與再分配、糧食市場銷售計劃、食品加工與零售部門 國有化，以及價格和匯率控制等政策，如何衝擊本地生產，導致更依賴進 口。 研究結果顯示，查維茲一系列政策，重組了土地產權、糧食生產體 系、市場制度和分配機制，雖形成「混合市場經濟」，但由國家主導並掌 控價格制定和供應分銷體制，具「官僚價格協調經濟」特徵。私有食品加 工部門因為被「徵收」或進料限制，造成生產下降；反之，國有糧食生產 體系之主體「社會經濟部門」，卻因政府的「最高售價限制」與「市場價 格」之間持續擴大的差距，強化了「投機／套利」誘因，而導致「短缺」和黑市交易。國家又變相地擴大「徵收」，以及價格控制的範疇與數量。 最終，政策制度抑制了私部門的生產，又變相地鼓勵國有生產體系去投 機，導致國內生產下滑，更仰賴進口。

The paper examines the Venezuelan food and agricultural policies imposed by ex-President Hugo Chávez during 2001-2013 in order to explore why and how Venezuela became heavily reliant on food importation and eventually led to severe food shortage in 2014 when oil price collapsed. The research uses institutionalism and institutional complementarity as analytical framework, aiming at exploring how a series of food and agricultural policies, namely, land reform, price and exchange control, and nationalization of agroindustry sector under the framework of ''Food Sovereignty'' and ''The State Transition to Socialism of the 21st Century,'' had restructured the land ownership, food market institution and governance structure, and ultimately struck heavily on the local food production. The findings show that Chavez's policies have transformed Venezuela into a ''bureaucratic price coordination economy,'' in which the state controlled the economic policies in terms of the food pricing, supply chain distribution, and currency exchange. Unfortunately, the institutional incentive encouraged the social economy sector to strengthen ''speculation'' and ''arbitrage,'' which in turn, resulted in more ''shortage.'' However, the state responded by expanding the scope of expropriation and price control, leading to a vicious cycle, i.e. shortage–expropriation- more shortage-more expropriation. Eventually, the synergy of institutional complementarity created negative incentive that is discouraging to local production and encouraging speculation. Therefore, Venezuela became more dependent on food importation, which later on, triggered a food crisis when the oil price plummeted