經濟發展對地方政府議價能力之影響－－以廣東省為例

The Effects of Economic Growth on Local Government's Bargaining Power: A Case Study of Guangdong Province

中國經改之前，意識形態和黨組織是維繫中央與地方行為一致的主要手段，但地方經濟開始蓬勃發展之後，中央賴以操控地方的強制手段被經濟發展與地方利益所削弱。各地逐漸成為獨立的經濟體，使中央與地方關係、由以往的強制服從關係朝向協商關係過渡。而且，在事權劃分不明等制度性缺陷下，雙方間的權力互動往往是以交換或議價等方式進行，但議價過程的勝敗除了各方所採取的議價策略之外，端視誰能掌握到較多的「權力」－特別是財政與經濟資源。在多年的改革開放之後，經濟成長與發展使廣東經濟實力得以迅速成長，在「兩個比例」日漸滑落之際，廣東已成為中央不得不依賴的財政支柱，進而在與中央的議價過程中得到越來越多的發言權。

The domination of CCP was descended from ideology and plan economics. Local governments abide by the CCP and central government regulations. In 1980's, Chinese central government endowed local governments with more economic resources and decision-making power. Economic decentralization has provided strong incentives for local officials to pursue economic development and cultivate their interests. FDI accelerates Guangdong's economic growth and develops its financial and bargaining power. Bargaining is used in hierarchical structure. The traditional relationship between the central government and local governments has changed.