道作為習慣與組成：史賓諾沙式閱讀《老子》

The Way as Habit and Composition: A Spinozist Reading of the Lǎozǐ

作為《老子》核心概念的「道」常被認為是一種方法，其形式為對衝突和對立的無動於衷，甚至有的連結《老子》和史賓諾沙哲學的文章也這麼認為。但奉行無動於衷當作方法比較是康德式而不是史賓諾沙式的倫理，且《老子》的倫理學已被指出和康德的思想不合，故筆者試著將《老子》之道想為是一種狀態，內容為習慣與組成，在這上面筆者參考的是史賓諾沙、拉維森和德勒茲的思想，其後兩者有直接或間接受到史賓諾沙哲學的影響。筆者想要發展一種不強調方法和規則，但卻比較入世的倫理學。習慣可為此倫理學之基礎，因為它是自然界中的斷片融合之後的結果，所以它同時也是組成，並且不會超越所在的環境。習慣持續存在，並體現區辨性的抹消。同樣地，《老子》之道不會有大幅度的變動，其並被表現為「復歸於無」，此「無」並非絕對的空洞，而是支撐相異事物進入和諧狀態的媒介。「為道」會導向「無為」的狀態，而「無為」可被解釋成「無區辨性之為」以及進入一個大的整體的整合。但《老子》並未告訴人如何達成「道」，正如關於習慣的知識只可得於習慣形成之後。習慣意味著道的存在，但道並不以任何特定的習慣為目的。道並不是一種實現尚未存在之物的方法，而是一種會自然產生某些效果的存在。而道也可以變成不存在，所以和史賓諾沙意義下的神並不相同，道僅為組成，但可作為史賓諾沙之「共通概念」的基礎。

The Way of the Lǎozǐ has often been considered to constitute a method of indifference to conflicts or oppositions, even by works that try to relate the Lǎozǐ to the Spinozist tradition. Since adhering to a method of indifference is more Kantian than Spinozist and the ethics of the Lǎozǐ has been noted to be incompatible with that of Kant, I try to conceive the Way of the Lǎozǐ as a state of habit and composition, following the thoughts of Spinoza, Ravaisson, and Deleuze, the latter two having been explicitly or implicitly influenced by Spinoza. I want thereby to develop an ethics that does not put emphasis on methods or rules and that is more engaged in the actualities of the world. Habit can underlie this ethics because it is the result of fusion of segments of nature and is thus at the same time composition and does not transcend its environment. It also continues indefinitely and embodies the effacement of distinctness. Likewise the Way of the Lǎozǐ does not vary greatly and is expressed by a return to ''nothing,'' which is not an absolute void but supports the coming into harmony of different things. Practicing the Way leads to a state of ''no action,'' which can be interpreted as meaning ''no distinct action'' and integration into a larger whole. The Lǎozǐ does not tell us how to achieve the Way, just as habits are known only after they have been formed. Habit indicates the presence of the Way, but the Way does not have any particular habit as its goal. It is not a method to realize what does not yet exist, but an existence that naturally produces its effects. And since the Way can be non-existent, it is not God in Spinoza's sense, but simply composition, which serves as the basis of Spinoza's ''common notions.''