經濟衰退時期的研發承諾：董事會監督對成長機會的影響

R&D Commitment during a Recession: The Effect of Board Governance on Growth Opportunity

研發承諾帶動產品及市場創新，可為企業帶來較佳的績效。然而，研發投資之回收期長，且存在高度失敗率，使研發活動存在極高的風險。此外，研發成果存在資訊不對稱的問題，經常衍生管理人與股東間的代理衝突。由於經濟衰退時期，管理人經常會藉由裁減研發行為以獲致短期的利潤盈餘，而董事會是降低代理衝突的內部治理機制，故本研究乃檢驗在董事會監督機制下，管理人之研發承諾對未來成長的貢獻。實證時擇2002年及2009年景氣衰退期之臺灣729個上市櫃電子製造業為樣本，研究結果發現董事會規模愈大、董監持股比例愈高，則企業之研發活動對未來成長將存在正面影響。另外，本研究亦發現董事長兼總經理時，企業之研發活動對成長機會存在負面影響。

Research and development (R&D) investment results in product and market innovation, thus allows firms to achieve better performance. However, R&D investments are risky due to their long-term horizon and high failure rates. In addition, a firm's R&D investment that is subject to potential manager-shareholder conflicts due to imperfect information and asymmetric beliefs about project payoffs. Managers often cut down the R&D commitment in order to achieve short-term profits during a recession. Moreover, the board is the most important internal corporate governance mechanism to remedy the agency conflicts. Hence, using 729 public offering firms as data set from Taiwanese electronics manufacturing industry in 2002 and 2009, this paper tests the the mediating role of board government between firm's R&D commitment and growth opportunity. The results of this paper show that increasing board size and board's ownership will positively moderate the relationship between a firm's R&D commitment and growth opportunity. Finally, this paper also found that CEO duality will negatively moderate the relationship between R&D commitment and firm's growth.