亞理斯多德論快樂

Aristotle on Pleasure

亞理斯多德在《尼各馬科倫理學》第七書中將快樂定義為「自然狀態未受阻礙的活動」。這個定義通常被認為與第十書的表述「快樂完善活動」不一致，因為按照這個表述，快樂彷彿是與活動有區別、一個額外的完善。本文認為這兩書的快樂定義並未有不一致，兩者只是同一定義的不同表達。因在「快樂完成活動」的表述中，快樂雖指稱某種主觀的愉悅感，但這種愉悅感乃是與它完善之活動不可分割，附隨在活動上的。此外，亞理斯多德在這兩書關於快樂的基本倫理學立場也是一致的：兩書都試圖在享樂主義者歐多克所斯（Eudoxus）與反享樂主義者斯珀西波斯（Speusippus）間尋求折衷立場。

In book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines pleasure as an ''unimpeded activity of one's natural state.'' This definition of pleasure is usually held to be inconsistent with the formulation of book X that ''pleasure completes the activity.'' For according to the formulation of Book X, pleasure seems to be an additional element which is distinct from the activity, whereas in book VII Aristotle wishes to identify with the activity. In this article, I will point out that these two definitions are not inconsistent| both are merely two formulations of one and the same definition. I want to suggest that, although in the formulation that ''pleasure completes the activity'' pleasure is referred to as a pleasant feeling or sensation of the subject, still this feeling or sensation is indistinguishable from the activity that it completes| it rather supervenes on the activity. Moreover, Aristotle general positions on pleasure in both books are quite the same: in either book, he tries to achieve a compromise between the hedonist Eudoxus, who held that pleasure is the good, and the anti-hedonist Speusippus who denied that pleasure is good.