會計師雙簽制度對審計品質之影響

The Effect of the Dual-Signature Requirement on Audit Quality

台灣自1983年開始施行由兩位會計師同時在查核報告上簽名之會計師雙簽制度，本文以雙簽制度施行前後之公開發行公司為樣本，探討會計師簽發之審計意見在單簽或雙簽制度下是否存有顯著差異。實證結果顯示，會計師雙簽制度下，會計師簽發非無保留審計意見的機率顯著較高。同時，雙簽制度施行下，會計師僅對上市公司簽發非無保留審計意見之機率提高，並未提高會計師對其他公開發行公司簽發非無保留審計意見的機率。此外，聘請會計師雙簽的公司，盈餘資訊內涵與盈餘反應係數顯著較單簽制度為高，代表資本市場亦肯定會計師雙簽制度對於盈餘品質之正面影響。

Auditing standards and regulations in Taiwan require two audit partners to sign their names on the audit report (dual-signature hereafter) since 1983. This paper examines whether audit quality is higher under the dual-signature requirement than under the singlesignature requirement. Empirical results indicate that the dual-signature regime is associated with higher audit quality as proxied by issuing more modified audit opinions, and that such an association exists only for companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, but not for non-publicly traded companies. In addition, the informativeness of earnings and earnings response coefficients are higher under the dual-signature requirement, suggesting that investors perceive higher earnings quality under the dualsignature requirement.