立法院積極議程設定之理論與經驗分析：第二至第六屆

Positive Agenda Setting in the Taiwanese Legislature: Theory and Evidence(1993-2007)

當前用於解釋美國國會立法過程的立法理論，皆假定立法機構中存在一多數黨，且無法對多數黨在黨內同質性與黨際分化程度發生變動時的積極議程設定權提出明確的預測。針對僅有單一立法樞紐（即多數黨或聯盟）的台灣立法院，本文提出一個積極議程設定理論模型，解釋此立法樞紐在不同條件下的積極議程設定權與立法成功。本文預測多數聯盟施展積極議程設定權的能力會受到提案推動成本（例如聯盟席次大小、單一政黨或多黨組成多數聯盟）與提案優先性的影響。這些由本文模型推導出的假設，在過去的研究中皆未曾被提出。為了更嚴謹檢驗這些假設並獲得更穩固的經驗分析結果，我們蒐集第二至第六屆（1993-2007）所有的立法提案。

Existing legislative theories, which are developed to explain legislativedynamics in the U.S. Congress, presumes the existence of a majority party in a legislature and fails to provide predictions about positive agendapower of a majority under various degree of intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity. Offering a theory of legislative majority coalition to explain its positive agenda power and proposal passage in the Taiwanese legislature, where only a single pivot exists, this paper hypothesizes that a majority coalition’s ability to exert its positive agenda power depends on passage costs