從精神分析的說話主體與哲學的認識主體談「認識你自己」的弔詭性

The Paradox of “Know Thyself”: Differentiating Psychoanalytic Discursive Subject and Philosophical Cognitive Subject

西方傳統哲學以事物自身（比如理型）保證事物存在的思維，使得事物與其自身的同一成為認識的原型，並因而將思想緊縛於存有之上。此認識論與自戀以及思想與存有的緊密關聯所形成的同一思想，不僅排除了當代哲學所關注的他人或相異性，也屏除了在愛中向他人開敞自身的可能性。不同於認識自身之所是（être）的對於「人之理型」的愛，他人所可能引發的同一性的分裂，挑戰著以事物自身作為價值對象的思維模態。究竟與他人的關係如何挑戰著以存有為依歸的認識論所實現的「認識你自己」？朝向上或外的超越為何弔詭地呈顯著回返自身的不可能？當代哲學與精神分析對於「認識你自己」這句箴言有著如何的反省？哲學與精神分析的關係如何？本論文將從區別精神分析的說話主體與哲學的認識主體之差異出發，重新闡釋「認識自己」的意涵。

Traditional Western philosophy utilizes the thing-in-itself (such as Ideas) to guarantee the existence of the things, so that the identity of the thing and itself has become the prototype of cognition, and thus the thinking is tightly coupled to the Being. This identical thinking formed by the close connection between epistemology and narcissism, thought and Being, not only excludes the Other or the alterity that contemporary philosophy pays attention to, but also eliminates the possibility of opening itself to others in love. Other than the love of knowing what it is (être) for the “idea of the humanity,” the abruption of the identity that may be triggered by the Other, challenges the mode of thinking that which sees thing-in-itself as the valuable objects. How does the relationship with the Other challenge the “know thyself” realized by the epistemology based on Being? Why does the transcendence upwards or outwards paradoxically demonstrate the impossibility of returning to itself? How does contemporary philosophy and psychoanalysis reflect on the aphorism “know thyself”? What is the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis? This essay attempts to reinterpret the meaning of “know thyself,” starting from the difference between psychoanalytic discursive subject and philosophical cognitive subject.