內閣制國家總統的憲政角色：德國與義大利的個案分析

The Constitutional Role of the President in a Parliamentary System : The Cases of Germany and Italy

在傳統的觀點中，當代採行議會內閣制的民主國家在制度設計上，具有一個作為國家象徵而不具實權的國家元首。在君主國體的內閣制中，國家元首為虛位君主（例如英國、日本）；在共和國體的內閣制中，國家元首則為虛位總統（例如德國、義大利）。然而，從2017年至2018年間德國與義大利先後發生的組閣爭議中，我們可以看到這些內閣制國家的總統在組閣過程中扮演舉足輕重的角色，與一般傳統認知中對於內閣制虛位元首的想像有相當落差。事實上，在當代採行共和國體的內閣制國家，總統在憲法規範上的權力，及其在實際憲政運作上的角色，是一個看似淺顯而被忽視，但值得深入探索的議題。本文一方面將對全世界所有共和國體內閣制民主國家的憲法規定進行檢視，以確認總統在內閣制此類憲政體制中的一般角色定位；另一方面則以德國與義大利這兩個內閣制國家為焦點，探討兩國總統的憲法權力與憲政角色。本文的研究發現應能對我國未來的憲政改革提供一些理論線索。

Traditionally, the role of the head of state in a parliamentary system would be considered to be a symbolic one, without concrete power. In a monarchy (such as England and Japan) it is the king or queen; in a republic (such as Germany and Italy) the president who is the symbolic leader. However, recent cases in Germany and Italy contradict this assumption. Both presidents played significant roles during the government's formation. The constitutional power which the president holds in a parliamentary system and the role he or she can play in practice is indeed a question which deserves more attention. In this paper, the competencies of the presidents in other countries with parliamentary systems will be examined, to establish a common baseline for presidential power. Secondly, the constitutional power and presidential role in the internal political practice of two countries, Germany and Italy, will be looked into more closely. The findings of this research could offer a useful theoretical foundation for future constitutional reform in Taiwan.