公司治理與庫存現金

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CASH HOLDINGS

本文主要是發展出一個理論模型來探究庫存現金在公司治理中所扮演的角色，而公司治理的目的是在於抑制經理人進行投資決策時想要加碼投資的自利行為。本文研究結果發現，最適公司治理標準應隨著經理人的代理問題嚴重程度及公司在產業發展的不同階段而彈性調整，代理問題愈嚴重或位於產業成熟期的公司，應採取愈嚴格的治理標準，一體適用的治理標準可能對成長期的公司不利。在允許外部融資的情況下，最適的公司治理標準將提高，有助於實現較高的股東權益價值，而隨著公司資產的流動指數愈高，若沒有要求充分的資訊揭露，經理人將會選擇偏高的投資水準，故公司治理標準必須更嚴格。此結論也意指公司治理標準應隨著資產流動性的變動而跟著調整。

In this paper, I develop a theoretical model in which we explore cash holding as acorporate governance mechanism. By using this mechanism, shareholders restrain the selfinterestedbehavior of managers, such as increasing capital inputs when making investmentdecisions. I find that the optimal level of corporate governance intensity should be adjustedaccording to the severity of the managerial agency problem and the stages of thecompany’s industrial development. A stricter governance mechanism should be adoptedwhen the agency problem is more serious and the industry is more mature. Our findingsare summarized as follows. The application of governance mechanisms may be detrimentalto firm value when the firm grows at a fast rate. The optimal governance mechanism ismore intensive when external financing is allowed. For a firm with high asset liquidity andinsufficient information disclosure, a stringent governance mechanism should be applied toreduce over-investment problems. As such, the optimal intensity of corporate governancemechanisms should be flexible and dependent on various factors.