從「避險」到「軟制衡」：美國的策略如何改變越南的中國政策，2014～2019

From Hedging to Soft Balancing: How the U.S. Strategy Changes Vietnam's China Policy, 2014-2019

學界一般認為，冷戰結束後，隨著中國的快速崛起，包括越南在內的東亞小國對中國所採取的外交策略偏向「避險」或「接納」。文獻指出除了加強與中國的關係外，越南亦主動與各大國交好，並強調其要走著一個獨立、自主、多元且多方化的外交政策路線，此被視為越南對中國的「避險」策略。然而，本文認為有關越南對中國政策的分析較為單向，即大部分僅著重在越中關係本身的推拉力，而忽略了美國在其中的主動角色。因此，無法說明越南對中政策近期的動態變化。本文的論點是，基於安全與國家利益的考量，越南自2014年至2019年間對中國的政策已經從「避險」轉向「軟制衡」。本文認為，這種改變由「懲罰性因素」及「激勵性因素」所驅動。懲罰性因素乃為中國自2014年之後所給越南帶來的壓力和威脅比此前更為明顯，表現在於中國在南海的強硬姿態、越南過度依賴中國經濟等，使得越南要在「抗衡」與「扈從」之間做出選擇，而難以繼續維持其過往模棱兩可的「避險」策略。激勵性因素所指的是美國因素，近年，為了圍堵和遏制中國的崛起，美國不斷地拉攏中國周邊國家，其中越南成為美國戰略佈局中的重點國家之一。而另一方面，越美兩國之間存在諸多戰略利益上的交匯，使得越南更願意接受美國的示好。進一步靠攏華盛頓可以使得河內擁有更多的籌碼來應對北京。不過，越南的抗衡舉動尚處於較為「低調且軟性」的程度，故本文稱之為「軟制衡」。

The conventional wisdom assumes that East Asian countries have been adopting “hedging” or “accommodating” strategy toward China since the end of the Cold War. By putting forward an “independent, diversified and multidirectional foreign policy,” Vietnam has attempted to strengthen relations with a number of major powers, including China. As a result, Hanoi is regarded as a typical “hedger” towards Beijing. This paper, on the contrary, argues that the relating analyses on Vietnam’s China policy are somewhat onesided, i.e. primarily focusing on the Vietnam-China relations themselves, but neglecting the initiative role of the United States. Consequently, they cannot demonstrate some recent dynamic changes in Vietnam’s China policy. This paper contends that Vietnam’s China policy gradually shifted from hedging to soft balancing from 2014 to 2019 given considerations for its security and national interests. This change is largely prompted by both “punitive factor” and “incentive factor”. The former is defined as the obvious pressure and threats posed by China since 2014, which includes China’s unyielding stance in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s excessive dependence on China’s economy, etc. Vietnam is, thus, forced to choose either balancing or bandwagoning in the continuum instead of its ambivalent hedging strategy. On the other hand, the incentive factor refers tot he United States’ inducing Vietnam into its quasi coalition targeting at containing China’s rise due to Vietnam’s growing role in its strategic layout. At the same time, Vietnam has become more willing to embrace the America’s inducements given the increasingly converging strategic interests between the two countries. Moving closer to Washington gives Hanoi more bargaining chips to handle with Beijing. Yet, such balancing act of Vietnam is still in low profile, which can be addressed as “soft balancing”.