英文摘要 |
This study aims to explore the public pawnshops in Postwar Taiwan and interpret the institutional arrangement of the state in the fringe finance. In respond to the financial repression policy in early 1950s, the public pawnshops were established so as to avoid the private pawnshops exploits the public with high interest rate, which in another way, stabilized the social order. However, this study found that fringe finance not only complemented the function of formal financial inadequacy, but also had political functions and purposes. The state deliberately depressed the interest rate of the public pawnshops in order to benefit the armed forces and the public officers, who were the majority of the borrowers, and limited the amount of private pawnshops, giving the licenses mainly to the veterans, forming a particular business group. During the martial law period, the state had an active interference in the pawn market and withdrew during the financial liberalization period. It seemed to base on economic considerations, yet the entire pawn market had always been embedded in the patriarchal political arrangements. This study further points out that the consequence of the decreasing of the public pawnshops after 1990 was that the Pawnshop Act, mainly amended under the lead of the private pawnshop representatives, put the remaining two public pawnshops in Taipei and Kaohsiung on an unfavorable institutional position as they are forced to take more market considerations and are limited by the types of collaterals, turning their back to more economically-disadvantaged groups. |