立法院消極議程控制的邏輯與經驗分析（1993-2011）

The Logic of Negative Agenda Control in Taiwan's Legislature, 1993-2011

消極議程設定權意指將法案阻擋於院會二讀之前的權力，在數個國會中被認為是多數黨最穩固的立法權力。過去的研究顯示消極議程設定權在形塑立法動態上的重要性，但由於台灣立法院特有之制度，如二讀前有多個能阻擋提案之審查階段以及每一委員會有多個召委，既有理論意涵與經驗分析方式並不適用於台灣立法院。有鑑於此，本文建立一個融入台灣立法院制度特性的新理論架構以推導其消極議程設定權的運作與策略。本文主要論點是政黨考量院會二讀時須付出較高昂的動員與黨紀成本，所以偏好於二讀前之審查階段阻擋提案，並選擇其中動員成本最低之階段作為主要之阻擋手段。黨團協商制度在第三屆的改變為本文提供更多檢驗理論機會。我們蒐集立法院第二至第七屆（1993－2011）未通過提案之資料及其停留階段，分析結果顯示本文所提出之六個假設皆獲得資料的強力支持。整體結果彰顯黨紀與動員成本在立法院消極議程控制上關鍵性角色。

Negative agenda setting, which is defined as a power to block a bill from being considered on the floor for its second reading, has been found to be a majority party's most robust legislative power in several legislatures. While existing theories have greatly contributed to our understanding of how such a power shapes legislative dynamics, they are not quite applicable to Taiwan's legislature. This paper develops a new theoretical framework for negative agenda setting by incorporating Taiwan's unique legislative institutions, i.e., more pre-floor stages and multiple chairs of each committee. With considerable costs of disciplining and mobilizing party members on the floor, each party has strong incentives to kill a bill before the second reading, with their efforts focusing on the stage entailing least mobilization costs. The institutional change of party negotiation empowers us to derive additional important hypotheses. Overall, our hypotheses gain vast empirical support from newly collected data from 1993 through 2011, implying that party discipline and mobilization costs play a key role in negative agenda setting in the legislature.