英文摘要 |
Illegal lobbying is defined as the attempt to influence an administrative decision-making process politically when the decision under review has important implications in many public administrative sections, especially those concerning public benefits. Government officers often experience great pressure to make the right decisions when facing such illegal lobbying from either councilors or higher administrators, especially in situations where resources are limited. These illegal lobbying pressures initiate interrole conflicts and may affect the officer's commitment. This study was designed to examine the effect of illegal lobbying on interrole conflict and normative organizational commitment of accountants of the Kaohsiung Bureau of Accounting and Statistics (KBAS). These accountants are employees of the KBAS, but are also associated with their respective units, and therefore are committed to two separate organizations. A total of 373 accountants over various branch offices or units were enrolled for study. Our results show that illegal lobbing has a significant positive correlation with the accountant's interrole conflict and a negative correlation with their normative organizational commitment. Using Structural Equation Modeling, we found that interrole conflict has a complete mediation effect on the relationship between illegal lobbying and the accountant's normative organizational commitment to the KBAS and a partial mediation effect to their assigned units. |