德國出兵政策的國際關係理論再檢視－－從科索沃到阿富汗的國會辯論探討

Rediscovering International Relations Theories on German Use of Force Policies -Parliamentary Debates and Decision Making through Kosovo and Afghan

本文檢視德國從科索沃到阿富汗出兵政策的核心考量，並從聯邦議會的辯論過程中，探討不同政黨於不同時期之間所主張的核心考量與立論依據，進而回應國際關係理論對於德國出兵政策適用上的爭議。本文發現，新制度主義一如多數學者所主張的，在相關論述上確實是最常被提及的，其次才是現實主義，相對而言，歷史文化論的主張確實是在論述上較少提及。但是我們也可以看到另外一種現象，在任務開展之時，現實主義反而是最重要的論述，而一旦任務開展之後，現實主義與歷史文化論的論述便明顯下降，而變成新制度主義論述一枝獨秀。這樣的說法，與John S. Duffield (1998)的說法大致符合，也顯示德國出兵政策的系統性與一致性。

This research tests theories for explaining German decisions on use of force policies from Kosovo to Afghanistan. It examines the main discourses of German politicians through debates in the Bundestag (German Parliament). With cross-cases and cross-parties examination, results indicate the strength of neo-institutionalism and the weakness of historical-cultural analysis. Also, results show differences between the start and the extension of mission authorization. German politicians tend to use realist discourses at the first mandate of missions, but neo-institutionalism at the mandate of mission extension. This study concludes that German decision making vis-à-vis use of force policies is stable and systematic as John S. Duffield's findings showed in 1998.