由大股東適格性審查看公司治理

A Perspective Corporate Governance through Major Shareholders Qualitative Review

我國公司法、證券交易法、金融控股公司法對於大股東適格性審查均有規範但各有不同之規範標準；此可參考公司法第22條之1、證券交易法第43條之1第1項、金融控股公司法第16條第3項；而公司法第22條之1所重在於實質受益人揭露及洗錢防制等相關議題，至於證券交易法第43條之1第1項及金融控股公司法第16條第3項「大股東適格性」審查的問題，更涉及了國內公開發行公司、金控公司之董監席次取得，甚至影響經營權之變動。惟國內金融監督管理委員會對於金控公司的審查標準甚為嚴格，對於公開發行公司的審查標準則相對寬鬆，如配合最近公司法修正增訂第173條之1規定，賦予持有公司已發行股份總數過半數股份之股東，得自行召集股東臨時會之權利，不待請求董事會或經主管機關許可，則關於大股東適格性之審查依據，判斷標準等，則付之闕如。

The Company Act, Securities and Exchange Act, Financial Holding Company Act in Taiwan all have major shareholders qualitative review, but different regulation standards. The issue may refer to Article 22-1 of the Company Act, Article 43-1, Paragraph 1 of the Securities and Exchange Act, and Article 16, Paragraph 3 of the Financial Holding Company Act. Article 22-1 of the Company Act focuses on the disclosure of beneficial ownership and money laundering control. As for the issue about “major shareholders qualitative” review in Article 43-1, Paragraph 1 of the Securities and Exchange Act and Article 16, Paragraph 3 of the Financial Holding Company Act, it not only involves the acquiring of directors and supervisors’ seats in a domestic public company and financial holding company, but also the change in management rights. However, the Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C. (Taiwan) has very strict review standards for a financial holding company. For the public company on the other hand, the review standards are relatively loose. Basing on Article 173-1 of the Company Act which has recently been advised and that grants shareholders continuously holding 50% or more of the total number of outstanding shares the right to convene a special shareholders’ meeting, without the need to request for permission from the board of directors and competent authorities, it may represent what has been lacking from the review and evaluation standards for major shareholders’ qualitative review.