公開發行公司之公司治理、機構投資人與股東行動主義

The Corporate Governance of Public Companies,Institutional Investors, and Shareholder Activism

本文回顧國際公司治理界近年蓬勃興起的股東行動主義現象，分析機構投資人如避險基金、共同基金、退休基金及股權研究代理機構於此現象下扮演的角色，探討股東行動主義對董事優位主義帶來的理論衝擊與衍生的短期主義與利害關係人保護問題。以此為基礎，本文進一步觀察我國本土特色的股東行動主義案例如寶佳機構等案件，指出我國的股東行動主義相對係由法人投資人而非避險基金為主導者的特色，並且研究股東行動主義興起的證券交易法制與公司治理法制背景，以及股東行動主義對資本市場法制可能帶來的衝擊，包括大額持股申報、內線交易、毒藥丸政策、機構投資人受託人責任、股權研究代理機構監理、水平持股等法制問題，以突顯新時代的公司治理挑戰。

In this paper, I visit the shareholder activism practice that is emerging in international corporate governance in recent years. I nalyze the role played by institutional investors, such as hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and proxy advisors, and explore the theoretical impact posed by shareholder activism on director primacy as well as the associated problems such as short-termism and stakeholder protection. On these bases, I observe the shareholder activism cases in Taiwan, such as the Pao-Chia case, and identify that Taiwanese shareholder activism features the leadership by corporate institutional investors instead of hedge funds. I further study the background of securities laws and corporate governance leading to the emergence of shareholder activism as well as the potential impact posed by shareholder activism on capital market laws, such as blockholder disclosure, insider trading, poison pill policies, the fiduciary duty of institutional investors, proxy advisory regulations, horizontal shareholding, etc. These all reveal the corporate governance challenges in the new era.