英文摘要 |
A person will probably conduct a series of transactions merely trying to acquire stock for investment or desiring to dispose of his holdings. Meanwhile, if his action is not for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others, does his knowledge that in doing so he will affect the market price make his action unlawful? The related law in Taiwan is § 155(I)(4) of the Securities and Exchange Act that was transplanted from § 9(a)(2) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, both rules are quite different from each other in the required elements of manipulation. Additionally, due to the difficulty in proving inducement, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and courts have not made much use of § 9(a)(2), opting instead to rely on § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 to prosecute manipulation. In order to balance the trader’s freedom of investment and the protection of other ordinary investors, the 2015 amendment to § 155(I)(4) of Taiwan’s Securities and Exchange Act added a new requirement which states that “when there is a likelihood that market prices or market order will be affected.” Therefore, in addition to meeting the existing requirements, the actor will be guilty only if he commits such an “offence of abstract-concrete endangerment (abstrakt-konkrete Gefährdungsdelikte)” as described in the German law. However, according to the recent court opinions, such a revision seems to make no significant difference in the final judgments of the most cases in Taiwan. This article compares and analyzes the legislative history and practical development of both the U.S. and Taiwan laws and discusses whether the mensrea of conducting a criminal series of transactions shall be redefined. Finally, this article also tries to provide policy suggestions for future revision of the law so as to facilitate more effective prosecution of punishable stock speculation in Taiwan. |