英文摘要 |
While managing and deciding the business and affairs of a corporation, directors shall fulfill their fiduciary duties and be liable for their breaches. This is the fundamental statutory scheme of modern corporate jurisprudence in the light of the separation of ownership and control. However, if the fiduciary duties of directors are too rigid, and the liabilities for directors’ beaches are too severe, the fundamental statutory scheme may serve as a disincentive to corporate directors. It of course is not the legislative intent of corporate law and may run afoul of the legislative purposes of protecting the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In addition, from the perspectives of corporate autonomy, it shall be recognized that a corporation shall be allowed to strike its own policy with a view to its directors’ fiduciary duties, liabilities for their breaches, and the indemnifications to reflect to its individual operational needs. The corporate statutory scheme of the United States has long taken them into account and develop a body of precedents, law and regulation which may serve as a valuable reference. This Article begins with the discussions of the law of directors’ fiduciary duties, liabilities for their breaches, and the indemnifications in the United States, and then analyzes its development and current judicial opinions, and compares with the law of its Taiwanese counterpart. Hopefully, the discussion and analysis may make a contribution to the future reform to the corporate law in Taiwan. |