憲法解釋作為憲法續造──一個方法論的反思

憲法作為規範國家組織與人民基本權利的基本法，跟其他的法規範一樣，一經制定與公告生效，即無法停留在制定或發布的那一刻，尤其在現代憲政民主國家中，憲法是真正具有拘束性的法，拘束著政治系統的權力運作，提供其規則與渠道，使其在憲法授權範圍內得以形成具體的政策與法規，憲法這種使政治成為可能的特質，反過來也成為政治系統用來獲取權力的正當工具，這就是憲法的雙面性，這種雙面性使得憲法得以成為法律系統與政治系統之間結構耦合的形式，並具體體現在國家的總體組織與行為中。

In the first part of this article, I use the prohibition of consecutive terms of Grand Justices in Taiwan’s constitution to demonstrate challenges in constitutional interpretation and theory, particularly the problem that traditional (German) legal methodology might face. I explain why constitutional interpretation is distinctive from typical legal interpretation and review the limitations of literal and teleological interpretation on constitutional cases. I also challenge the dogma of the distinction between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional gap-filling”. In the second part, I address theories of constitutional interpretation in the United States. First, I discuss the theory of “originalism”. Then I focus on the “new originalism” with the emphasis on the distinction between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction”. I explain why the critiques of the “living constitutionalism”, the opponent of “new originalism”, are valid. Lastly, I argue that the “living originalism” advocated by Balkin, who reconciles originalism with living constitutionalism, substantially treats constitutional interpretation as constitutional construction, although he superficially insists on this istinction. Balkin’s arguments are consistent with my main argument in the first part.