總經理減薪效應、公司治理與家族企業

CEO Pay Cuts, Corporate Governance and Family Business

高階管理者薪酬一直是代理問題的焦點。本文有別於過去的研究，從總經理個人薪酬的角度探討績效－薪酬之關聯性，以及公司內外部監督力（獨立董事比例與機構投資人持股比率）所產生之效益。且進一步區分家族企業總經理身分（專業經理人／家族成員），檢測兩者在總經理減薪與績效之差異。配合台灣對薪酬揭露之規定，研究期間為1999－2004年。實證結果顯示，前期績效不佳將導致總經理個人被減薪，且當獨立董事比例越高、機構投資人持股比率越多時，也越容易發生總經理減薪的情況，且當總經理個人被減薪後，績效確實會有所回升。再者，家族成員總經理減薪可能性低於家族企業的專業經理人，而家族企業的專業經理人在減薪後，績效回升的幅度則大於家族成員總經理。

CEO compensation has been the focus of agency problems for a long time. This study differs from previous research studies by investigating the relationship between performance and compensation from the perspective of executive compensation, and the benefits of internal and external control mechanisms of companies (the proportion of independent directors and shareholding ratio of institutional investors). The identity of the CEO in a family businesses is made distinct (i.e., professional manager or family member) to examine the responses to pay cuts in difference types of CEOs. In line with the provisions for compensation disclosures in Taiwan, the study was conducted between 1999 and 2004. The results indicate that businesses which underperform in the previous year leads to pay cuts for the CEO, this is more likely to occur when there is a higher proportion of independent directors on the board of directirs. A higher shareholding ratio of institutional investors yield similar results. Nevertheless, CEOs who are family members of family business are less likely to undergo pay cuts compared to professional CEOs. In general, CEO performances are found to rebound following their pay cuts, with professional CEOs having greater improvements.