論被害人生命法益處分權之限制－－以刑法父權主義批判為中心

Reflection on the Limit of the Right to Dispose of Life－Criticisms about Paternalism in Criminal Law

本文的目的，在於從刑法父權主義的角度，檢討對被害人生命法益處分權之限制，具體層次上則涉及加工自殺罪的正當性判斷。在檢視各種父權思想內涵之後，作者認為，只有容許欠缺自願性時之國家干預的軟性父權主義，始能脫免典型父權主義邏輯，並與自由主義取得相容性。但相較於一般所採的高度標準，本文主張僅需具有一般認知與判斷能力即可滿足自願性要求。在此理解下，加工自殺罪所描述的各種行為態樣，都已預設了當事人的自願性，因此該罪並無正當性。

The purpose of this article is to review the limit on the victim’s right to dispose of life from the perspective of paternalism. The focus would be the legitimacy of the offence of assisted suicide. After reviewing all the attempts to justify the paternalism, the author finds that the soft paternalism, which allows the governmental involvement in the case lack of voluntariness, is compatible with the liberalism and can avoid fallowing the typical logic of paternalism. The author holds that instead of the high level of voluntariness, which is argued by the soft paternalism, the natural competence of autonomy should have sufficed for the requirement of voluntariness. In this context, all the behaviors prescribed as the offence of assisted suicide have preconditioned the voluntariness of the victim. Therefore, there is no legitimacy for this offence.